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Foreword 
STEVE SANDERS* 
One hundred years ago this year, a group of prominent American professors came 
together to form the American Association of University Professors (AAUP). As a 
crucial part of this endeavor, they drafted a manifesto on academic freedom and 
tenure that set forth what must have been viewed, at the time, as revolutionary 
propositions about the role of the scholar vis-à-vis the university and the role of the 
scholar and the university together vis-à-vis the larger society.  
The AAUP’s 1915 “Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and 
Academic Tenure”1 represented nothing less than the dawning and assertion of a 
new professional consciousness and sense of identity among American college 
and university professors. The “conception of a university as an ordinary business 
venture, and of academic teaching as a purely private employment,” it announced, 
“manifests also a radical failure to apprehend the nature of the social function 
discharged by the professional scholar.”2 “That function,” it went on to explain, 
was “to deal at first hand, after prolonged and specialized technical training, with 
the sources of knowledge; and to impart the results of their own and of their 
fellow-specialists’ investigations and reflection, both to students and to the 
general public, without fear or favor.”3  
Strikingly, the Declaration analogized the relationship between professors and 
their institutions’ boards of trustees to that between federal judges and the president. 
Faculty members, it said, “are the appointees, but not in any proper sense the 
employees,” of university trustees.4 For professors, as for judges, independence is 
essential to the job. “University teachers,” the Declaration said, “should be 
understood to be, with respect to the conclusions reached and expressed by them, no 
more subject to the control of the trustees, than are judges subject to the control of 
the President, with respect to their decisions . . . .”5  
The rationale for academic freedom, according to the Declaration, was ultimately 
not moral or legal, and there was no suggestion that the Constitution was involved. 
Rather, the rationale was instrumental and public-regarding. Society’s welfare and 
progress depend on the work universities and their faculties do. And so as part of the 
bargain, society is obliged to keep its hands off as much as possible because 
scholarship best flourishes under conditions of free thought and experimentation 
where communities of academicians are allowed to govern themselves to the greatest 
extent possible. “A university,” the Declaration explained, “is a great and 
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indispensable organ of the higher life of a civilized community,”6 and thus “any 
restriction” on professors’ teaching or research “is bound to react injuriously upon 
the efficiency and the morale of the institution, and therefore ultimately upon the 
interests of the community.”7 
Obviously, American higher education is a much different enterprise today than 
it was in 1915, whether our lens is legal, sociological, economic, or epistemological. 
But even if some of its conceptions might strike us today as quaint and outdated, it 
is widely acknowledged that the 1915 Declaration remains the starting point for any 
serious discussion of the theory of American academic freedom.  
To mark the Declaration’s 100th anniversary, this symposium presents articles by 
three leading scholars of academic freedom, each considering a facet of how the 1915 
Declaration applies to problems of American colleges and universities today. Shorter 
versions of these articles were originally presented on a panel in January 2015 at the 
annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools in Washington, D.C.  
In his article The Social Value of Academic Freedom Defended, J. Peter Byrne 
seeks to reinforce the foundational premise of American academic freedom: that the 
work professors do is valuable to the larger society because, for example, it provides 
the necessary facts and analysis for competent policy making and democratic self-
government. This idea has come under attack most prominently by Stanley Fish, an 
advocate of the “minimalist” view of academic freedom, which holds that the 
primary end of academic work is little more than the self-gratification of those who 
engage in it. Professor Byrne argues why Professor Fish’s view is both wrong and 
harmful.  
Amy Gajda’s article, Academic Duty and Academic Freedom, addresses a related 
point: that lawmakers, judges, and the general public will not continue to tolerate a 
high degree of autonomy in decision making by colleges and universities if 
academics do not hold up their end of the bargain to contribute to society by making 
the products of academic work accessible and relevant. After a review of recent court 
decisions that reflect this erosion of autonomy, Professor Gajda calls for universities 
to place greater value in their tenure standards and reward structures on their 
professors’ public outreach and engagement work.  
Another essential premise of the 1915 Declaration’s exposition of academic 
freedom is that the academic profession can and must police itself according to 
rigorous standards of professional ability evaluated through peer review. In his article 
The Regrettable Underenforcement of Incompetence as Cause to Dismiss Tenured 
Faculty, David Rabban argues that institutions have become too reluctant to dismiss 
professors who have grown chronically unproductive as scholars and ineffective as 
teachers. Addressing such “dead wood,” he argues, would “restore tenure to its 
legitimate function, increase popular support for it, and improve faculty morale.”8  
These articles by no means exhaust the range of contemporary issues and 
controversies surrounding academic freedom. But at least they remind us, on the 
1915 Declaration’s centenary, that academic freedom cannot be taken for granted. 
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Society is dynamic, and higher education constantly changes and adapts. And so it is 
always necessary to consider how foundational principles apply to contemporary 
realities. 
  

